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Abstract
Economic theories of rational addiction aim to describe consumer behavior in the presence
of habit-forming goods. We provide a biological foundation for this body of work by formally
specifying conditions under which it is optimal to form a habit. We demonstrate the empirical
validity of our thesis with an in-depth review and synthesis of the biomedical literature concern-
ing the action of opiates in the mammalian brain and their effects on behavior. Our results
lend credence to many of the unconventional behavioral assumptions employed by theories of
rational addiction, including adjacent complementarity and the importance of cues, attention,
and self-control in determining the behavior of addicts. We offer evidence for the special case
of the opiates that “harmful” addiction is the manifestation of a mismatch between behavioral
algorithms encoded in the human genome and the expanded menu of choices faced by consumers
in the modern world.
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1 Introduction
The immature seed pod of papaver somniferum1 contains a bitter, milky sap. Even in this, its most
natural form, opium is a powerful drug, a stimulant narcotic poison that can induce hallucinations,
profound sleep, or death. Reduced to its most sought-after chemical constituent, morphine, or
further processed into heroin, opium is highly addictive and can have dramatic effects on the be-
havior, health, and well-being of its users. Opium’s natural and synthetic derivatives (collectively
known as the opiates) have well-known effects on human physiology and behavior: once they make
their way into the bloodstream, opiates reliably induce a state of euphoria and pain relief, often
followed by an increase in food consumption (Morley et al. 1985, Gosnell and Levine 1996, McKim
2002). Many who experience this state of mind find it pleasurable, and are inclined to try it again.
But chronic use of opiates can result in severely impaired health,2 and desperate addicts sometimes
resort to theft or prostitution to obtain money to sustain the habit (National Institute on Drug
Abuse 2000). Given the potentially lamentable personal and social consequences of drug addiction
(and the undeniable fact that legal restrictions have not been fully effective in eliminating drugs
like heroin from the streets), many would agree that modern society would be much improved if our
species could somehow rid itself of this particular human weakness.
Though the effects of opiates have been known to man for more than five millennia (Booth 1996),
only in recent decades has modern science made clear that opiate-like substances are also produced
naturally in the bodies of humans and other animals. These substances are known collectively as
the endogenous opioids and, like their poppy-derived counterparts, they have been shown to induce
euphoria, pain relief, and appetite stimulation (van Ree et al. 1976, Yeomans and Gray 1996, Mercer
and Holder 1997, Bodnar and Hadjimarkou 2002).
The similarity of opiates and the endogenous opioids might seem something of a curiosity at
first blush. Given the dramatic negative effects of opiates, what business do our bodies have
producing their chemical cousins? There are, fortunately, many ways to answer this question, as
the scientific literature is now replete with evidence demonstrating the circumstances under which
our bodies produce endogenous opioids, the distribution of and variation in the endogenous opioid
system across species, speculation about their evolutionary origins, and even confirmation that the
biochemical “recipe” for endogenous opioids is firmly–and apparently universally–encoded in the
human genome. This essay will attempt to identify circumstances under which a tendency to
become “addicted” might serve a useful function, review supporting evidence from the biomedical
literature, and ask what our findings might tell us about drug addiction. In other words, we will
develop a theory of natural addiction.
2 Background
2.1 Rational Addiction
A major source of inspiration for this investigation, and therefore a reasonable starting point for this
essay, has been the rich body of theoretical and empirical work on addiction within the economics
literature. This literature of rational addiction employs the formal mathematical tools of the
economist in modeling addiction as a well-defined decision problem to be solved by an optimizing
consumer. This approach allows for–and indeed, to some extent requires–the precise statement of
the properties of the decision environment that generate addiction. It also allows for the application
of the standard tools of welfare analysis in developing implications for drug policy.
The essential feature of most theories of rational addiction is the concept of adjacent complemen-
tarity, first employed in this context by Becker and Murphy in 1988. Adjacent complementarity
1Commonly known as the opium poppy.
2The medical complications of chronic heroin use, for example, can include fetal death, scarred and/or collapsed
veins, bacterial infections of the blood vessels and heart valves, abscesses (boils) and other soft tissue infections, disease
of the liver or kidney, pneumonia, and tuberculosis. Death from overdose is not uncommon (National Institute on
Drug Abuse 2000).
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requires that consumption of an addictive good today generates even more consumption of that
good tomorrow–or more precisely, that the marginal utility of consumption increases with experi-
ence. This property is more general than the popular conception of addiction, of course, and–as
Becker and Murphy emphasize–could be used to describe any consumptive behavior in which habits
are formed.
The work of Becker and Murphy is notable for its bold assertion that the decision to consume
addictive substances is indeed a decision, and as such it can be viewed as a rational decision in
a standard economic framework: to be sure, the argument goes, there may be negative personal
consequences stemming from addiction, but the fact that many people nevertheless choose to con-
sume addictive substances suggests that–for these people–the benefits of addiction must outweigh
the costs. From this beginning, behavioral implications such as the responsiveness of addicts (or
potential addicts) to drug prices and criminal penalties, or the dynamics of addiction (e.g., why
some people might choose to quit “cold turkey”) can be derived. Indeed, the model offered by
Becker and Murphy does seem to capture many aspects of the behavior of addicts, and its main
empirical prediction (that announced increases in the future price of addictive goods should decrease
current consumption) has been largely borne out in subsequent analysis (see, e.g., Becker et al. 1994,
Grossman et al. 1998, and Gruber and Ko¨szegi 2001).
In spite of the success of the Becker-Murphy theory of rational addiction, several authors have
subsequently noted that in many respects the particulars of Becker-Murphy are not consistent with
what is known about the psychology of addiction and the subjective experience of addicts. It has
been suggested, for example, that rather than the world of perfect information, foresight, and self-
knowledge implicit in Becker-Murphy, addicts face uncertainty regarding the future consequences
of addiction (Orphanides and Zervos 1995, 1998), may have problems with self-control (Fehr and
Zych 1998, Gruber and Ko¨szegi 2001, Gul and Pesendorfer 2001, O’Donoghue and Rabin 2002), and
may be influenced by emotional or psychological states (Loewenstein 1996, Laibson 2001, Bernheim
and Rangel 2002). There is clearly some truth in each of these critiques, but all of these authors
continue to take as given the primitive behavioral property responsible for addiction: adjacent
complementarity.3 In what follows we take a step back from this descriptive approach and ask
under what circumstances habit formation of the type implied by the theory of rational addiction
might be optimal. In particular, given the universality of the brain chemistry that makes our species
and many others susceptible to drug addiction, we ask under what natural conditions the quirky
behavioral property known as adjacent complementarity might have arisen. It is our hope in doing
so that a more parsimonious and richly descriptive theory will result.
2.2 A Few Words on Biological Foundations
Our aim, to be more explicit, is to identify circumstances in the evolutionary history of the human
species in which addiction-like behavior was optimal in a well-defined sense. Because this approach
is a departure from the standard practice among purveyors of economic theory4, our reasons for
adopting it should be clarified. First, as outlined in the previous section, the pursuit of a psycho-
logically realistic theory of rational addiction has generated a multiplicity of formal models–all of
which claim some degree of generality–and it is not immediately obvious which should be applied
to a given instance of habit formation. Second, the primitive behavioral assumptions in rational
addiction theories vary widely, as do the corresponding implications for welfare analysis. The ap-
3Though we emphasize complementarity here, precise formulations vary. Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), for example,
define a good to be addictive if past consumption makes a person more prone to over-consume the good in the future;
Bernheim and Rangel (2002) define an addictive good as one for which past consumption enables neutral cues to
trigger a “hot state” that can lead a person to consume the good again even if additional consumption is not in his
best interest; and Orphanides and Zervos (1998) generate intertemporal complementarity by allowing addictive goods
to alter the time preferences of consumers. Nevertheless, these authors all rely on strong–or at least unconventional–
primitive assumptions regarding the behavior of addicts.
4Several authors have argued that knowledge of human evolutionary history might help to inform economic theory.
See, for example, Hirshleifer (1977), Hirshleifer (1985), Rogers (1994), Bergstrom (1996), Robson (2001), Samuelson
(2004), and Smith (2002).
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plication of a naturalistic perspective to this model selection problem can help to resolve these two
related shortcomings. Viewing habit formation from the perspective of behavioral biology can help
to answer fundamental questions about, for instance, the role of information and uncertainty in
decision-making, and can provide the investigator with well-defined conditions for the generation of
“harmful” addictions.
In what follows, we will ultimately conclude that addiction is intimately and undeniably related
to the phenomenon of associative learning, and that adjacent complementarity can arise from a
simple Bayesian learning process. We will arrive at this conclusion not because it is the most
intuitive explanation for substance abuse, nor because it is the explanation most consistent with
the reported experience of addicts. Rather, we will argue that addiction-as-learning (or, under
specified condictions, addiction-as-misplaced-learning) is fully consistent with the observed behavior
of addicts, and that no other explanation is consistent with the evidence from neuroscience.
Because the architecture of the human nervous system is rarely invoked as a source of empir-
ical evidence in economics,5 we begin by offering a brief explanation for our emphasis on internal
biochemical events as a starting point for a theory of natural addiction. One might imagine, af-
ter all, that the principles of behavioral biology could be applied to the phenomenon of addiction
without reference to neuroscience. This would require nothing more than a search for examples of
addiction-like behavior exhibited by animals in their natural habitat, and followed by the identifi-
cation of reasons why–in natural settings–such behavior might have given its practitioners an edge,
over the ages, in the currency of survival and reproduction. Hypotheses thus arrived at would
then be subject to the usual scrutiny of scientific method: variation in the relevant environmental
variables would be expected to generate corresponding variation in addiction-like behavior, both
within and across species, and so forth. This approach suffers from at least two drawbacks: i) in
spite of the rigorous debate in the behavioral and medical sciences over what exactly constitutes
an addiction, no consensus has emerged6; and ii) it might turn out that the behavioral manifesta-
tions of “addiction” in natural settings bear very little resemblance to their modern counterparts in
neuroscience laboratories and urban ghettos.
The approach we have chosen, suggested in the opening paragraphs of this essay, is to begin with
an addictive substance, make note of the internal biochemical and physiological changes it induces in
users, and search for examples of circumstances in which these same internal changes are observed
in animals in their natural habitat. These circumstances will then presumably lead, as above,
to hypotheses about the natural origins of addiction. This approach is possible, of course, only
when scientific knowledge of the relevant internal molecular processes is in a relatively advanced
state. In what follows we will make use of the fact that heroin, the quintessential example of
an addictive substance, affects its victims by mimicking the endogenous opioids, one of the most
thoroughly studied molecular systems in modern neuroscience. We acknowledge at the outset that
this approach, with its narrow focus on a single class of substances, runs the risk of generating
conclusions with only limited generality; this issue will be discussed further in Section 4.1.
2.3 The Adaptive Function of Endogenous Opioids
2.3.1 Opiates and Opioids
It has long been known that rats, given the opportunity, will self-administer morphine to the point
of addiction. Whether pushing a lever to trigger an intravenous injection or sipping from a dilute so-
5This may be changing, as evidenced by a growing body of research being published under the rubric of “neuroe-
conomics”; for a recent review, see Camerer et al. (2005). Though these authors often make passing reference to the
fact that the human brain bears the mark of a system that evolved to solve specific adaptive problems, the bulk of
the research being done at the interface of economics and neuroscience has been aimed at using the techniques of the
neuroscientist (e.g., brain imaging) to prove (or disprove) the predictions of economic theory. Our approach, on the
other hand, is to address the question of biological origins directly, and to formulate hypotheses consistent with what
is known about the human nervous system.
6Indeed, one aim of this essay is to propose a meaningful definition of addiction. This issue is discussed further
in Section 3.2.1.
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lution, opiate-using rodents exhibit all the symptoms of addiction seen in their human counterparts:
active substance-seeking behavior, reinforcement, tolerance, and withdrawal (see, e.g., Headlee et
al. 1955, Weeks 1962, van Ree et al. 1976). In addition to being exceedingly convenient for the
purposes of conducting experimental research on addiction, the fact that we share such a complex
trait with a relatively distant cousin in the animal kingdom suggests strongly that there is something
deeply innate and biological about drug addiction.
The specifics of the activity of morphine within the body have become known relatively recently.
One of the more useful early innovations in opioid research has been the discovery of drugs that
block or counteract the effects of the opiates. These drugs, known as opioid antagonists, often
have opiate-like chemical structures and exhibit little or no interaction with non-opiate drugs. The
theoretical underpinning to the action of opioid antagonists is that they interact with opioid receptors
and compete with the opiate ligand.7 In other words, when an opiate molecule (or more generally,
an opioid agonist) enters the bloodstream, it circulates through the body until it comes into contact
and binds with an opioid receptor, which is then activated. If a large number of opioid receptors
are activated simultaneously (e.g., if the concentration of opiates in the bloodstream is high), this
triggers the cascade of physiological and behavioral changes associated with opiate use. Opioid
antagonists, on the other hand, prevent the action of the opiates, often by binding with (but not
activating) the target receptors, thus physically blocking the opiates from taking effect (Cooper,
Bloom, and Roth 2002). Though the opioid receptor was for many years merely a hypothetical
construct, in the early 1970s advances in biochemical assay technology enabled scientists to confirm
that there was indeed an opiate-specific receptor, located in cells throughout the body (though
particularly concentrated, as it turns out, in certain regions of the brain) with test-tube reactivities
mirroring the pharmacological activity of opiates and their antagonists, while exhibiting no reactivity
with other drugs (Simon et al. 1973, Pert and Snyder 1973, Terenius 1974).
Opioid antagonists have been invaluable tools for addiction research. Early studies showed that
the opioid antagonists naloxone and naltrexone effectively attenuate the physiological and behavioral
effects of morphine in rats and monkeys, and even induce symptoms of withdrawal in morphine-
using subjects (Weeks and Collins 1976, Harrigan and Downs 1978, Killian et al. 1978). The
subsequent approval of these drugs for use in humans has provided evidence of their effects on
subjective experience (Griffiths and Balster 1979). Naltrexone, for example, is known to effectively
block the feeling of euphoria associated with heroin use, and for this reason it was once viewed as
a promising treatment for heroin addiction. Unfortunately, the effects of opioid antagonists on
drug self-administration are not straightforward: just as rats and monkeys have been known to
increase consumption of morphine and heroin in response to naltrexone treatment (presumably to
compensate for the reduction in hedonic effect), human addicts aware of the effects of naltrexone
will often voluntarily discontinue treatment in order to once again experience the hedonic pleasures
of heroin. For this reason, methadone (a mildly addictive opioid agonist) is often used for weaning
addicts from heroin, although naltrexone is sometimes an effective tool under controlled (inpatient)
conditions, as a surgical implantation, or with particularly motivated patients (Jaffe and Martin
1990, Mello and Negus 1996).
In spite of the enormous body of research into the intricacies of the workings of the endogenous
opioid system in humans and other animals, very little attention has been paid to the question
of natural origins we hope to address here. It is known, however, that opiate administration
causes subjects to increase short-term food intake, to develop a preference for the location/place
of administration, to become insensitive to pain, and to lose interest in sexual activity (van Ree et
al. 1999, 2000). These observations, together with studies pointing to the centrality of endogenous
7Receptors and ligands are the locks and keys, respectively, of biochemistry. Though the degree of specificity can
vary, ligands typically serve as the body’s messengers: by virtue of their unique physical and chemical properties,
ligands have the ability to selectively activate their target receptors, often triggering physiological responses at the
cellular level. The textbook example of a ligand/receptor system is insulin, secreted by the pancreas in response to
high blood sugar and detected by receptors throughout the body, touching off a variety of compensatory processes
that bring blood sugar back into the normal range. Common subcategories of ligands include hormones, peptides,
and neurotransmitters (Nelson 2000).
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opioids in ingestive behavior, palatability, and food cravings (Mercer and Holder 1997, Yeomans and
Gray 2002), are consistent with an adaptive function for the endogenous opioids in guiding feeding
behavior in natural settings.8 The next section will examine more closely the role of the endogenous
opioids in modulating feeding behavior, and provide a sketch of the kind of adaptive problem they
seem to be designed to solve. A formal statement of this problem is provided in Section 3.
2.3.2 Endogenous Opioids and Ingestive Behavior
There is widespread evidence pointing to a central role for endogenous opioids in the short-term
regulation of food intake. Numerous studies have shown that rats, for instance, will eat less after
being injected with opioid antagonists (e.g., Holtzman 1974, Ostrowski et al. 1981, Sanger et al.
1983, Simpkins et al. 1985), and the reverse is true for morphine and other opioid agonists, which
reliably generate an increase in short-term food intake (Martin et al. 1963, Rudski et al. 1992,
Gosnell and Levine 1996).9 Similar responses have been observed in a wide variety of other foraging
animals, from slugs (Kavaliers, Hirst, and Teskey 1985) and cockroaches (Kavaliers et al. 1987) to
cats (Foster et al. 1981), pigs (Baldwin and Parrot 1985), and humans (Cohen et al. 1985, Atkinson
1982).
A widely held view in the scientific community posits that opioids mediate food intake by in-
fluencing the perceived palatability of foods (Yeomans and Gray 1996, Mercer and Holder 1997).
In human subjects, opioid antagonists reduce both the hedonic ratings of palatable foods and the
pleasantness ratings of palatable food odors, but do not reduce stated hunger ratings (Fantino et al.
1986, Yeomans and Wright 1991, Drewnowski et al. 1992, Yeomans and Gray 1996). If it is true, as
the behavioral effects of opioid agonists and antagonists seem to suggest, that endogenous opioids
in our brains cause food to taste good, then we might expect that good-tasting food causes our
brains to release endogenous opioids. There is evidence that this is indeed true: for instance, the
consumption of sweetened foods (but not bitter foods) causes an immediate release of β-endorphin
in the brains and cerebrospinal fluid of rats (Dum et al. 1983, Yamamoto et al. 2000), and acute
exposure to sweets induces reduced pain avoidance in rats and human infants, an effect that can be
reversed with naltrexone (Blass 1986, Blass et al. 1987, Blass and Hoffmeyer 1991).
So we are presented with the following puzzle: When an individual eats a food containing sugar,
he triggers a biochemical cascade that causes him to eat more of that particular food, irrespective
of his immediate caloric needs. Why might such a system have evolved? In other words, what
competitive advantage might be gained by foraging animals that exhibit such a preference for sweet
foods?
The answer given by behavioral ecologists is derived from the distribution of sugar in nature.
High concentrations of simple carbohydrates are found in natural settings only in ripe fruit, raw
honey, and mother’s milk, all of which reliably contain a host of valuable micronutrients (and,
importantly, a dearth of toxins).10 This suggests a simple role for endogenous opioids in an optimal
foraging framework: when an environmental cue (such as the presence of sugar) indicates that a
particular food is likely to have nutritional value, endogenous opioids are released in the brain,
generating the appropriate behavioral response.
Of course, sugar is not the only cue omnivorous animals use in distinguishing beneficial food-
stuffs from harmful or useless ingesta: the tongues of humans and other omnivorous mammals have
8The endocrinology of feeding is, of course, more complicated than this: many other molecular signals have been
implicated in short-term feeding behavior, including serotonin, dopamine, neuropeptide Y, and cholescystokinin.
These molecules are neglected here for the sake of brevity. Readers interested in the molecular complexities of short-
term ingestive behavior are referred to the review by Cooper and Higgs (1994); the molecular basis of the long-term
regulation of caloric intake–a different but related adaptive problem–is reviewed in Cummings and Schwartz (2003).
9Although opioid antagonists were once viewed as a promising tool in the treatment of obesity, most studies have
shown that they have little effect on feeding or body weight in the long term (Si, Bryant, and Yim 1986).
10This distribution is not accidental: in a textbook example of coevolution, fruit-bearing plants rely on the services
of foraging animals to disperse their seeds. This explains why fruit nearly always contains bitter or sour compounds
and a green skin prior to maturation (i.e., before the seed is viable) and–when fully ripened–comes packaged not only
with a brightly colored skin and edible, nutritionally valuable flesh, but also with non-digestible seeds or pits (see,
e.g., Raven et al. 1999, pp. 546-551).
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compound-specific receptors not only for simple carbohydrates but also for sodium, glutamate11, and
(perhaps) essential fatty acids–all of which could serve as nutritional cues in natural environments–
and also for many toxic compounds, the dangers of which are perceived as a bitter taste, each of
which appears to trigger an opioid response (Gilbertson and Kim 2002, Sullivan 2002). In social
animals such as humans, sheep, and chickens, it is also known that social cues play an important
role in dietary choice12, the response to which also appears to be opioid-mediated, as evidenced by
the coincidence of autism (a developmental disorder characterized by both a specific deficit in the
ability to read social cues (Baron-Cohen 1995) and by deficiencies in the endogenous opioid system
(Kalat 1978, Gillberg and Lonnerholm 1985, Campbell et al. 1988, Leboyer et al. 1988, Leboyer et
al. 1990)) and abnormal dietary behavior in childhood (Raiten and Massaro 1986). And one of the
most important classes of cues for foraging animals–those that recall the location of valuable food
sources–also constitute one of the most easily demonstrated effects of drugs such as morphine and
heroine (Mucha et al. 1982, Mucha and Iversen 1984).
Although the endogenous opioids no doubt have functions other than the regulation of short-
term ingestive behavior, and short-term ingestive behavior is no doubt regulated by numerous other
neuroendocrine processes in addition to the endogenous opioids, our aim here is to effect a simple
demonstration of the way in which the solution to one particular adaptive problem might generate
addiction-like behavior. In the next section we offer a formal model in which an environmental cue
(the representative example of which is sugar) serves as an aid in the solution of a basic foraging
problem: avoidance of micronutrient deficiency.
3 A Model, with Supporting Evidence
3.1 Informative Cues and The Diet Problem
3.1.1 A Balanced Diet
In what follows we present a stylized model of nutritional ecology with informative cues. A foraging
animal (“agent”) is faced with a menu of two foods, x and a, and must choose how much of each to
consume, given the limited capacity m of his gut and (physical) food densities 1 and 1/p, respectively.
There is a single limiting micronutrient for which there is a critical threshold: if the agent does not
consume k units of nutrient, he will die. Unfortunately, this implies that survival is by no means
certain, as the nutrient concentrations in foods x and a are independent random variables, denoted
Cx and Ca, with distribution functions Fx and Fa, respectively. Our agent can, under these
circumstances, do no better than to minimize the odds of death by malnutrition.13 Formally, the
balanced diet problem can be stated as follows:
max
x,a
P (Cxx+ Caa ≥ k)
s.t. x+ pa ≤ m (1)
x, a ≥ 0
Given the inherent uncertainty in this decision problem, it is clear that a cue providing new
information about the nutritional value of one of the foods might alter the outcome. We will
consider such a signal by positing two (informational) states of the world: one in which no cue is
present, as above, and one in which a “positive” cue is observed, implying that the concentration
of the limiting micronutrient in good a (the “addictive” good) is given by the random variable Ĉa,
11Glutamate is a form of the amino acid glutamine, a molecular building block of protein. Glutamate is found in
many natural foods; it is also the “G” in the flavor enhancer MSG.
12See review in Smith (2004).
13Or equivalently, to maximize his probability of survival. In accordance with the principles of evolution by
natural selection, agents able to calculate, intuit, or otherwise implement the correct solution to this problem would
presumably out-compete their more death-prone brethren, and come to dominate the population in the long run.
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with distribution function F̂a. To distinguish between these two information states, we will refer
to the no-cue balanced diet problem and the positive-cue balanced diet problem. For purposes of
illustration, we restrict our attention initially to distribution functions having the form F (c; γ) = cγ ,
where γ > 0, and in particular, to the following parameterization:
Case 1 “Cobb-Douglas Cue”:
Fx (cx) = cx
Fa (ca) = c
β
a
F̂a (ca) = c
β̂
a
, where β and β̂ are parameters of the distribution
functions such that β̂ > β > 0
We are now ready to state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the agent faces concentration distributions described by Case 1 and the solution
(x∗, a∗) to the no-cue balanced diet problem is such that x∗, a∗ > k, then in the solution (xˆ, aˆ) to the
positive-cue balanced diet problem, his consumption of good a will be strictly greater, aˆ > a∗.
All proofs are provided in the Appendix. 14,15
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Figure 1: Effect of a Positive Cue (β = 1 and β̂ = 2)
It is also possible to make a more general statement about the conditions necessary for the cue
to result in an increase in consumption of good a (relative to the no-cue optimum a∗), and doing so
will provide a useful illustration of the intuition behind the problem. In Proposition 2, we consider
the effect on the probability of survival of making a small (ε) movement along the budget line in
the direction of increasing a. Such a movement, of course, simultaneously decreases the amount of
food x consumed, so there are two distinct effects on the probability of survival, which we denote
the ε-benefit (i.e., the increase in probability of survival attributable to the increase in a) and the
14The assumption that x∗ and a∗ are greater than k in Proposition 1, made for analytical convenience, deserves
comment. In the naturalistic interpretation given here, this assumption is equivalent to assuming that in the absence
of a positive cue, the agent will choose to consume enough of each good that if the nutrient concentration in either of
these goods were 100%, then his consumption of that good alone would be enough to ensure his survival. Given the
typically miniscule concentrations of micronutrients in natural foods, and the large amounts of food typically ingested
by foraging animals (relative to the required quantity of micronutrients), we expect that this condition would rarely
be violated in natural settings.
15In the Appendix we show that in Case 1, for x, a > k, the agent’s behavior will be observationally equivalent
to that of an agent maximizing a Cobb-Douglas utility function (Corollary 2). The properties of this class of utility
functions are well known.
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ε-loss (i.e., the decrease in probability of survival attributable to the decrease in x).16 To formulate
our more general condition we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The distribution functions Fx, Fa and F̂a have density functions fx, fa and f̂a,
respectively.17 Moreover, the probability mass is distributed over the entire unit interval, i.e.,
fx (cx) > 0 whenever cx ∈ (0, 1) and fx (cx) = 0 whenever cx /∈ (0, 1). The corresponding con-
ditions are also satisfied by fa and f̂a.
18
Now we are ready to state our necessary and sufficient condition.
Proposition 2 Let Assumption 1 be fulfilled. In addition, assume that there exist unique solutions
x∗, a∗ > k and x̂, â > k to the no-cue balanced diet problem and the positive-cue balanced diet
problem, respectively, and that the indifference curves associated with the objective functions of the
no-cue balanced diet problem and of the positive-cue balanced diet problem going through point (x∗, a∗)
cross only at point (x∗, a∗). Then a cue increases the consumption of a if and only if there exists an
ε > 0 such that the ε-benefit exceeds the ε-loss.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is perhaps best illustrated by considering how various real-
izations of the random variables Cx and Ĉa translate into survival. The probability of survival for
a given allocation (x, a) can be represented graphically in (cx, ca) space. In Figure 2, the line inter-
secting the vertical axis at ka (i.e., cxx + caa = k) represents for our agent the ultimate threshold:
any realization (cx, ca) above this line and the agent survives; any realization below and he dies.
With an ε-movement along the budget line (i.e., to the allocation
(
x− ε, a+ εp
)
), the threshold
pivots to intersect the vertical axis at ka+ εp
. This change in consumption increases the survival area
by B while it decreases the survival area by L. Thus the probability that (cx, ca) falls in B is the
ε-benefit, while the probability that (cx, ca) falls in L is the ε-loss.
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(
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p
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= k
Figure 2: ε-benefit and ε-loss
Thus far we have addressed only the effect of an informationally valuable cue in a static choice
environment. But if our aim is to say something about the relationship between this environment
and addiction-like behavior, we will need to consider the dynamics of the balanced diet problem. In
the next section we examine the simple dynamics of choice when learning is possible.
16Explicit definitions of ε-benefit and ε-loss are provided in the Appendix.
17We assume the existence of density functions to simplify the statement of Proposition 2.
18Restricting the support of these density functions to the unit interval is motivated by basic laws of physics:
nutrient content cannot be less than zero or greater than 100%.
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3.1.2 The Simple Dynamics of Learning
In order to capture the notion of learning within our formal framework, it is necessary to re-formulate
the decision problem slightly. In Section 3.1.1, consumption decisions were always made with
complete knowledge of the probability distributions underlying the foods of choice. To accommodate
learning, we will now impose a modicum of foresight on our agent, requiring him to choose a diet
before confirming the presence or absence of a cue. In so doing, we will show how the simple dynamics
of Bayesian learning can generate adjacent complementarity, the behavioral property driving theories
of rational addiction.
Again, we distinguish between two states: the no-cue state in which the agent’s objective function
is given by u (x, a) = P (Cxx+ Caa ≥ k) and the positive-cue state in which his objective function is
given by u (x, a) = P
(
Cxx+ Ĉaa ≥ k
)
. The following assumption imposed on these two “utility”
functions is consistent with the framework developed in Section 3.1.1.
Assumption 2 The functions u and u are twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave
in the area satisfying x, a > k. In addition, the no-cue balanced diet problem and the positive-cue
balanced diet problem have unique solutions
(
xc, ac
)
and (xc, ac)respectively, with ac > ac; xc, ac > k;
and xc, ac > k.
A bundle (x, a) maximizes the probability of survival in period t if it solves
max
x,a
E [Πtu (x, a) + (1−Πt)u (x, a)]
s.t. x+ pa ≤ m, (2)
x, a ≥ 0
where Πt is the random variable describing the agent’s prior beliefs in period t concerning the
possible probabilities with which a positive cue might arise. Hence, Πt maps into the space of
probabilities and thus takes values on [0, 1]. We shall denote by gt the density function describing
the distribution of Πt.
19
In what follows, we write vt for the objective function of problem (2). We can therefore re-write
problem (2) as max
a≥0
vt (m− pa, a) by the monotonicity of vt. After choosing a bundle (m − pa, a)
the agent observes the period t outcome (i.e., presence or absence of a cue) and updates his beliefs
for period t + 1 in a Bayesian manner. In order to isolate the effect of the positive cue, we will
assume the agent’s budget constraint remains the same in every period. If he observes a positive
cue in period t, his posterior beliefs are given by
gt+1 (pi) =
pigt (pi)∫ 1
0
pigt (pi) dpi
(3)
for all pi ∈ [0, 1]. We shall denote by Πt+1 the random variable corresponding to density function
gt+1.
As noted in Section 2.1, the dynamic property known as adjacent complementarity has been
identified as essential to a behavioral theory of addiction. In the present framework, an analogous
property can be concisely defined:
Definition 1 The agent’s behavior meets the conditions for adjacent complementarity at period t
and at point (m− pa, a) ∈ R2+ on the budget line if ddavt (m− pa, a) < ddavt+1 (m− pa, a).
Our next proposition states sufficient conditions for adjacent complementarity.
19It is convenient but not necessary to assume that the distribution of Πt has a density function; our results can
be derived by assuming a general distribution function Gt.
10
Proposition 3 If Assumption 2 is satisfied, then a positive cue generates adjacent complementarity
at any time t and at any point (x, a) lying on the budget line such that a ∈ [ac, ac]. Moreover, if
the agent chooses a bundle in period t such that x∗, a∗ > k, then a∗ ∈ (ac, ac) and x∗ = m− pa∗.
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of Proposition 3 the agent’s behavior exhibits adjacent comple-
mentarity at the optimal solution (x∗, a∗) of problem (2).
3.2 Addiction as Learning Gone Awry
3.2.1 What is Addiction?
In the theory of rational addiction, a good is addictive, roughly speaking, if its marginal (instanta-
neous) utility increases with experience. Rational addictions, however, may be either beneficial or
harmful depending on how experience affects total (instantaneous) utility: in a beneficial addiction
total utility increases over time, while in a harmful addiction it decreases over time. In the popular
lexicon, the word addiction generally excludes the former case: one might have “good” as well as
“bad” habits, but addiction is generally taken to imply a regrettable behavior. The careful reader
will have noticed that thus far the model we have presented seems to imply that all “addiction” is
beneficial: in the learning dynamic we have proposed, utility (or its proxy in our framework, the
expected survival probability) is always increasing over time, as the agent learns more about the
world in which he lives. Now we turn our attention to the subject of harmful addiction.
The circumstances we propose as being conducive to harmful addictions are perhaps best illus-
trated by returning to our representative example of a behavioral cue. Although sugar is conve-
niently associated with valuable micronutrients in natural settings, the advent of commercially viable
sugar refining technology early in the twentieth century changed this association dramatically. To-
day, foods with the highest sugar content often contain no micronutrients whatsoever; in fact, one
of the most consistent messages of modern health advocates has been a simple admonition: eat less
sugar. But the biochemical system upon which we rely in choosing our foods has not changed:
being encoded in our genes in a way that leaves it mostly immune to conscious manipulation, the
endogenous opioid system still reacts to sweet foods as if they remained a rare and valuable com-
modity. Within our framework, this implies a discrepancy between the behavior of the agent and
maximization of the objective function vt. We will find it useful, therefore, to specify a subjective
function, v˜t, that reflects the probability distributions F̂a and Fa and density function gt prevalent
in what might be called the agent’s “ancestral environment”–that is, the conditions to which the
agent’s behavior is adapted.20 This suggests the following definitions:
Definition 2 The agent’s behavior meets the conditions for subjective adjacent complementarity at
period t and at point (m− pa, a) ∈ R2+ on the budget line if dda v˜t (m− pa, a) < dda v˜t+1 (m− pa, a).
Definition 3 The agent’s behavior meets the conditions for a harmful addiction at the decision
sequence (x1, a1) , (x2, a2) , . . . on the budget line if it satisfies subjective adjacent complementarity
at (xt, at) and vt (xt, at) > vt+1 (xt+1, at+1) for all periods t.
As our example suggests, we will consider the special case in which the cue does not convey
any information, so that F̂a is identical to Fa. This implies (for the objective function v) that vt =
vt+1 = u in equilibrium for all periods t independently of the agent’s beliefs about the probabilities
of the arrival of a positive cue. The agent’s subjective function, however, still specifies that Ĉa and
Ca have different distributions. In Proposition 4 below we denote by (x˜t, a˜t) the solution of the
problem that we obtain from (2) by replacing vt with v˜t.
20Decision theorists have long held that beliefs can be thought of as subjective, or implicit in one’s behavior. It
is in this sense that we use the term. Leonard Savage’s classic 1954 treatise provides an advanced but accessible
exposition of this notion.
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Proposition 4 Let Assumption 2 and ac > a˜t > a
c for all t be fulfilled. Moreover, suppose that
although a dissociation of the cue from the limiting micronutrient results in an uninterrupted series
of positive cues that provide no information, the agent continues to maximize the subjective function
v˜t. Then a harmful addiction will occur at the sequence (x˜1, a˜1), (x˜2, a˜2), . . . .
In effect, Proposition 4 says–for the special case of technological change considered here–that
harmful addictions are the product of a mismatch between the modern world and the “beliefs”
about the world implicit in our behavior.21 This mismatch is generated, in the present example,
by the rapidity with which food processing technology has advanced while the human genome (in
which, it bears repeating, the “recipe” for the endogenous opioid system is literally written) has
remained effectively unchanged. In other words, our approach suggests that a harmful addiction is
a habit acquired under false pretenses.
In spite of the evidence presented thus far, some readers may nevertheless remain uncomfortable
with the notion of “sugar addiction”. Recent studies by Hoebel and his colleagues have suggested
that sugar does indeed share more properties with drugs of addiction than had previously been
thought: feeding rats excessive amounts of sugar, for example, and then either depriving them of
food or injecting naloxone induces symptoms typical of opiate withdrawal such as teeth chattering,
forepaw tremor, and head shakes (Colantuoni et al. 2002). Remaining skeptics may find solace in
the fact that replacing “sugar” with the word “alcohol” in this story will not change its character or
consistency with available scientific knowledge.22 The distribution of alcohol in nature mirrors that
of sugar (i.e., it is found only in ripe fruit), it is subject to opioid-mediated self-administration23,
and only industrial fermentation and distillation technologies have made it readily available in the
modern world (Dudley 2000). The recent identification of human genes that confer a higher risk
of alcoholism provides further support for the notion that alcohol consumption might have had
adaptive significance in human evolutionary history (Schuckit 1999).
It does not seem inappropriate to suggest that heroin addiction also fits well with the “mismatch”
model of addiction. When a user seeks out and injects heroin in order to experience once again the
sudden activation of the opioid receptors in his brain, he is following an ancient algorithm: when
the opportunity arises, devote your energies to activities that make you feel like this. The algorithm
is, of course, more complicated than this, and vestiges of the original function of the behavior
can be seen in some of the particulars of the experience of addicts: heroin addicts, for example,
reportedly experience overpowering cravings for sugar during withdrawal (Weiss 1982), and relapses
among reformed addicts are often triggered by place-specific contextual cues (Carson-DeWitt 2001).
Heroin, like refined sugar and distilled alcohol, is a relatively recent innovation in our collective
history, first synthesized from morphine in 1874.24
That the neurologically active substances such as morphine, cocaine, and nicotine found in plant
tissues might be harmful to our health is not surprising when the origins of these compounds are
considered. Once thought to be merely metabolic by-products, plant ecologists now believe that
compounds like these (which are energetically costly to produce but have no apparent function in
plant physiology) arose in the course of plant evolution as defensive mechanisms designed to deter
herbivorous animals.25 These substances effectively deter herbivory because they are highly potent
neurotoxins: for instance, the oral ingestion of as little as 2 grams (0.07 oz.) of raw opium (or 0.2
grams refined morphine, or 0.04 grams nicotine), can be fatal (Parfitt 1999). Coevolutionary forces
work both ways, of course, and animals have in turn evolved methods of avoiding plant toxins, most
21The “evolutionary mismatch” theory of substance abuse represents the conventional wisdom among students of
human evolution. See, for example, the work of Nesse and others (Williams and Nesse 1991, Nesse 1994, Nesse and
Berridge 1997 (but see also footnote 26)).
22It is the experience of the authors that although few will acknowledge an overly zealous propensity for alcohol
consumption in themselves, many are able to identify alcoholism in others.
23For a review of the large scientific literature implicating opioids in alcohol’s addictive properties see Van Ree et
al. 1999, pp. 375-378.
24In one of the more spectacular blunders in the annals of the pharmaceutical industry, heroin was originally
developed and marketed by The Bayer Company as a less-addictive form of morphine (Booth 1996).
25See, e.g., Raven et al. 1999, pp. 546-551.
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notably by detecting and then ejecting them, either by tasting them directly with receptors on the
tongue and spitting them out (bitter aversion) or by vomiting upon the onset of illness (nausea
aversion) (Smith 2004). This helps to explain why drugs of addiction are commonly smoked,
snorted, or injected but rarely chewed up and eaten: our bodies have natural mechanisms that
prevent ingestion of toxins. That some of these toxins, taken in moderation, selectively activate
specific “reward” centers in the brain that govern addiction appears to be an accident of plant-
herbivore coevolution. This “accident” nevertheless displays all the hallmarks of an adaptation in
natural settings.26 Raw opium, for instance, contains a host of alkaloids in addition to morphine,
many of which (e.g., papaverine, codeine, narcotine, and thebaine) have little or no narcotic effect
but act as stimulants of the medulla and spinal cord (Parfitt 1999). Taken together in their natural
form, these compounds constitute a dangerous drug cocktail, and one important function of drug
delivery technologies is to isolate–and thus detoxify–the target compound.
It has been conjectured that such a mismatch between objective reality and the “beliefs” about
the world implicit in our genes could explain the subjective difficulties with “self-control” many
people report when describing their experience with drugs of abuse or sweetened treats (Smith
2002).27 In the present context, the “belief” implicit in our genes (and also implicit–when viewed
in light of the evidence from the natural sciences–in our behavior) is that foods containing simple
carbohydrates are nearly always nutritionally valuable, while the objective reality is that in today’s
world such foods are more often than not lacking in such value. A literal interpretation of our
theory of harmful addiction implies an agent who perpetually expects a large benefit to accrue
from a particular activity, but–when the expected benefits are not realized–finds himself constantly
regretting his past actions.28 We contend that this interpretation has meaningful parallels with
economic theories of self-control or “time inconsistent” behavior: in these theories, the agent typically
overweights (i.e., assigns higher utilities to) current consumption to the detriment of his long-term
well-being (i.e., his future utility stream) (Ainslie 1991, Laibson 1997) . Within our framework, time
inconsistency is the manifestation of emotional mechanisms maladapted to certain aspects of the
modern world and underlain by molecular processes that operate below the level of consciousness.
3.2.2 Dopamine and the Neurobiology of Learning
Even the most devout hedonist would admit that habit formation (including drug addiction) can
be viewed as a case of learning. If the consumer finds that consumption of a particular good gives
him pleasure, for example, it would make sense to take this information into account when making
subsequent consumption decisions. If subsequent consumption provides additional information
(presumably also of a positive nature) about the hedonic properties of the good (e.g., higher levels
of consumption correspond to more intense pleasure), then the resulting behavioral dynamic could
closely approximate that predicted by a theory of rational addiction. But this explanation quickly
stretches thin where harmful addictions are involved: the typical drug addict quickly becomes
aware of the hedonic properties of his drug of choice, and his behavior often becomes increasingly
pathological (i.e., less informed by the dictates of informed rationality) over time. Is it really
appropriate, as we have suggested, to view harmful addiction as some kind of learning disorder?
One way of answering this question would be to identify the neurological basis of learning: if
our hypothesis is correct, drugs of abuse would be expected to act on the same physical substrates
employed in healthy, natural learning processes. While modern science is far from providing a
definitive picture of how the internal workings of the mammalian brain translate into sophisticated
26This hypothesis is not completely uncontroversial–some argue that substance abuse may have been around long
enough for the human genome to have developed defensive mechanisms (see, e.g., Sullivan and Hagen 2002). The
debate, however, is mostly one of degree: no one would argue, for example, that hypodermic needles have been around
long enough for humanity to develop an innate aversion to heroin.
27Indeed, in some situations admitting reasonable levels of subjective uncertainty can transform an apparent self-
control problem into an optimal behavioral strategy. Sozou, for example, shows that hyperbolic discounting of future
rewards can be optimal where default is possible and the hazard rate is uncertain (Sozou 1998).
28This interpretation is, of course, overly literal, because our hypothetical “expectation” need not be conscious or
even subject to conscious control.
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learning abilities, several authors have noted that one process in particular conforms well with
the predictions of classical learning theory: dopamine transmission in the limbic system.29,30,31
Although dopaminergic neurons are present in many areas of the mammalian brain, many of those
located in limbic system appear to have the intriguing property of being subject to activation by
natural rewards only when associative learning is taking place: in classic Pavlovian conditioning
experiments, these neurons are activated in the presence of novel, but not conditioned stimuli. In
other words, these neurons seem to indicate that learning is taking place: when an animal is first
presented with a novel visual or auditory stimulus while being fed a tasty treat, dopaminergic neurons
in his limbic system light up; but with experience, the stimulus/treat pairing loses the ability to
activate these neurons. Once a subject is conditioned, only “surprises”–such as the pairing of food
reward with a stimulus not previously associated with the reward–will re-activate the system.
So what are the effects of opiates on dopamine transmission in the limbic system? Interestingly,
stimulation of dopamine transmission in this part of the brain is one of the few properties shared by
virtually all drugs of addiction–not only opiates, but also alcohol, nicotine, cocaine, amphetamines,
and ∆9-tetrahydrocannabinol.32 The most powerfully addictive drugs, however, differ from natural
rewards in that their effects on dopamine transmission are not diminished by repeated administra-
tion.33 This would seem to suggest that if dopamine in the limbic system does in fact represent a
physical substrate of associative learning, then the sort of learning that takes place in the presence
of drugs of addiction is properly viewed as pathological.34
4 Discussion
4.1 Beyond Opioids
From the discussion of the previous section, it is clear that the logic of our analysis might well apply
to substances or circumstances that activate receptor systems having nothing to do with the opioids.
We urge caution on those who would extend our analysis in this way; and though for the remainder
of this essay we will turn to a more general discussion of habit formation, we do so with some degree
of trepidation. That some drugs target other receptor systems suggests that they are disrupting a
different adaptive response. In principle, before drawing conclusions about the adaptive function
of the receptor system targeted by a given drug of abuse, systematic study of the role of the target
system in natural settings should be undertaken. Once the adaptive function of the target receptors
29Though precise definitions vary, the limbic system in the mammalian brain is comprised of several interconnected
structures, generally including the amygdala, hippocampus, hypothalamus, septum, nucleus accumbens, cingulated
gyrus, and parts of the cortex. The limbic system is thought to play a central role in the regulation of emotions
(Brick and Erickson 1998).
30Although neurons (nerve cells) can employ more than one neurotransmitter at a given synapse (a synapse is the
gap between cells across which neurotransmitter ligands carry information), much intercellular communication in the
mammalian brain is mediated by neurotransmitters such as dopamine, norepinephrine, epinephrine, or serotonin in
distinct cells. Hence the terms “dopaminergic neuron,” “serotinergic neuron,” etc. See, for example, Zigmond et al.
(1999).
31Several authors have focused particular attention on the nucleus accumbens shell and the ventral tegmental area
as the putative loci of associative learning (Di Chiara 1999, Spanagel and Weiss 1999). Unfortunately, brain mapping
is far from an exact science, and similar observations have been made in other brain structures. The advanced state
of current technology, however, is evident in the recent report of Waeltl et al. (2001)–complete with simultaneous
measurement of eye position and the activity of individual neurons in the subjects’ brains–in which monkeys were
trained to associate the delivery of fruit juice with distinctive visual stimuli.
32∆9-tetrahydrocannabinol, or THC, is the pharmacologically active constituent of marijuana.
33The difference presumably stems from the fact that the endogenous neurochemical signals generated by natural
rewards are subject to adaptive regulation; exogenous ligands (i.e., drugs) are not subject to such limitations. It is
important to note that the distinction is not absolute: drugs of addiction are subject to habituation, but to a much
lesser degree than natural rewards.
34It is worth noting that the problem of “attention” emphasized in some alternative theories of rational addiction
(e.g., Laibson 2000, Bernheim and Rangel 2002) also appears to be a function of endogenous opioid activity, as
evidenced by both the role of opioids in adaptive pain management (ter Riet et al. 1998) and their interaction with
the dopaminergic system (Deth 2003).
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are identified, specific implications (including, for example, circumstances under which it is likely to
be used, or the sense in which it meets the criteria for “harmful” addiction) for the relevant addictive
substance would presumably follow. The prospect of such an undertaking for all behavior-altering
substances is daunting, given the unfortunate fact that–for most drugs–our understanding of the
myriad effects of such substances on human behavior, cognition, and physiology remains poor.
4.2 Foreseeing Addiction
As noted in Section 2.1, the question of the degree to which consumers foresee the consequences of
drug addiction is the subject of much debate in the rational addiction literature. Though we have
intentionally suppressed the possibility of foresight in our formal analysis (in order to emphasize that
even myopic decision-making can generate the dynamic properties necessary for habit formation),
there can be no doubt that consumers are to some extent aware of the future (social, health, and
economic) consequences of drug abuse. Not that people “know” the consequences of addiction in
the same way people “know” it’s good to eat ripe fruit, or the way people “know” the diet that
sustained them in childhood is unlikely to harm them later in life. But there’s every reason to
expect that people could learn from health that worsens with use, from watching relatives die or
suffer, from reading about health consequences, or from warnings on labels. Indeed, such learning
could well be interpreted within our framework as constituting “informative cues” that influence the
agent’s beliefs (i.e., F̂a, Fa, and gt ) and behavior accordingly. Or, extending our framework a bit,
an agent who becomes aware of the harmful dynamic associated with drug use might well choose to
quit “cold turkey” as the only way to stop the arrival of the hedonic “false cues” associated with
use.
The supposition that consumers choose with foresight is the driving force behind the main empir-
ical prediction of the rational addiction literature: that future price increases will generate a decrease
in current consumption. Several studies have borne out this prediction by measuring, for example,
the effect of announced (but not yet effective) increases in cigarette taxes.35 We acknowledge this
empirical phenomenon, but would also suggest an alternative explanation: it could well be that, coin-
cident with the announcement of tax increases on cigarettes, there is an increase in public awareness
(due, perhaps, to increased news coverage or increased funding of public health campaigns) of the
health consequences of smoking–indeed, such public awareness might well precede and precipitate
legislative action. We leave the question of the relative importance of these competing hypotheses
(foresight vs. awareness) for future research.
4.3 Implications for Public Policy
When the time comes to translate a carefully crafted economic theory of addiction into recommen-
dations for public policy, it quickly becomes clear that core assumptions about information and
personal responsibility drive everything. After all, the fact that drugs (both legal and illicit) are
bought and sold in the marketplace is what motivates the use of economic analysis in the first place,
and the primacy of the market mechanism in allocating economic resources is beyond dispute. If
it were true that consumers choose to consume addictive substances with complete foresight, with-
out uncertainty or self-control problems, there would seem to be little justification for government
to interfere with market transactions.36 But with uncertainty, incomplete information, and time
inconsistency, a role for policy is introduced for “paternalistic” reasons that don’t necessarily apply
35The most compelling support for this phenomenon is provided by Gruber and Ko¨szegi (2001); see also references
therein.
36This is strictly true, of course, only under idealized market conditions. If, for example, the additional healthcare
costs incurred by a smoker are covered by insurance, considerations of economic efficiency would dictate that the
smoker incur an equivalent cost (in the form of, say, a cigarette tax or increased insurance premiums) contingent on
his decision to smoke. The possibility of external effects (e.g., crime, or second-hand smoke) imposed by addicts
on others could also provide justification for market intervention. Such considerations are not unique to addictive
substances (and therefore will be largely neglected in the present analysis), but they would certainly warrant attention
in a more complete analysis of drug policy.
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to ordinary consumer goods.37 This aspect of drug policy finds support within our framework.
While it is hard to deny that the lives of heroin junkies might be improved by restrictions on drug
availability, our findings suggest that this same line of reasoning could be applied to more mundane
objects of consumption such as sugar-coated cereals, lollipops, and wine coolers.
We expect that our findings will come as good news to advocates of public health. We want to
be quick to note, however, that we do not mean to imply that individuals who choose to smoke, or
drink, or eat sweets are necessarily wrong, in the personal sense, to do so. First of all, the discrep-
ancy we noted between the objective function vt and the subjective function v˜t in Section 3.2.1 is to
some extent irrelevant to the considerations of human welfare implicit in economic analysis of public
policy. Conventional economic analysis rightly focuses on “as if” utility maximization–the equiva-
lent of our subjective function–because in most cases it represents the best best available proxy for
the real pleasure and pain experienced by consumers in everyday life. While it is evident, given
the historical novelty of modern drug technology, that the long-term negative consequences of drug
addiction are likely–in the absence of concerted efforts to educate the populace–to be systematically
underestimated by the average user,38 the trade-off between immediate pleasure and future costs
is just that: a trade-off. And it is not hard to imagine circumstances in which indulging in addic-
tion might, on balance, make an individual better off. Indeed, such circumstances are suggested by
changes in the incidence of cigarette smoking in the U.S. in the past four decades: as increasing regu-
lation and aggressive public education campaigns have sharply reduced the prevalence of smoking39,
the incidence of smoking has become increasingly concentrated in those with lower socioeconomic
status and in individuals suffering from such behavioral or affective disorders as depression, adult
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, anxiety disorders, and bulimia. In an insightful review of
the medical literature, Pomerleau (1997) has argued that in each of these cases nicotine dependence
appears to ameliorate the symptoms, making life more livable for the aﬄicted.40 In other words,
though smoking might play no beneficial role in a perfect world where health and happiness reign
supreme, that is not the world in which we live.
5 Conclusion
That human behavior can usefully be thought of as “rational” is a central tenet of economic theory.
But what do we mean by rationality? In the popular lexicon, rationality is coolly deliberate,
conscious decision-making. This standard of rationality is clearly not met for many users of illicit
drugs. A less rigorous standard is “as if” rationality–satisfied if observed behavior is consistent with
the solution to an optimization problem. Is this definition of rationality met for drug addiction? It
depends very much on how the problem is specified: if one is willing to be flexible with the domain of
preferences, with time inconsistency, and with uncertainty and prior beliefs, then surely any pattern
of behavior can be justified as the solution to an optimization problem. This is not to say that the
rigorous scientific debate over the essential properties of a positive economic theory of addiction has
not produced useful insights–on the contrary, this process is the lifeblood of scientific knowledge.
Nevertheless, it is our hope that by providing the beginnings of a biological foundation for the
theory of rational addiction, we will have helped in some small way to better inform the debate.
The framework developed here provides support for the notion that adjacent complementarity can
37Such policies might include, for example, taxes on drugs (Fehr and Zych 1998, Gruber and Ko¨szegi 2001), public
education campaigns (Orphanides and Zervos 1995, Bernheim and Rangel 2002), restrictions on advertising (Or-
phanides and Zervos 1995, Laibson 2000, Bernheim and Rangel 2002), regulation of drug dispensation (Bernheim and
Rangel 2002, Camerer et al. 2003), restrictions on public consumption (Laibson 2000, Bernheim and Rangel 2002),
rehabilitation programs (Orphanides and Zervos 1995), and criminalization (Bernheim and Rangel 2002).
38It has been noted (by, for instance, Kahneman et al. 1997), that consumer behavior often appears to be incon-
sistent with the intertemporal maximization of hedonic experience. Biased or false subjective “beliefs” of the sort
implied by our subjective function v˜t may provide one source of such inconsistency.
39Between 1965 and 1990, for example, smoking among U.S. adults declined from 40% to 29% (U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services 1989).
40Though the “self-medication” role for psychotropic substances remains controversial, few would argue that the
pain-relieving function of drugs such as morphine has not proved beneficial in the practice of modern medicine.
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be expected to be important in some consumptive behaviors, and that addiction might indeed be
related to problems with self-control, to emotional mechanisms, and to false prior beliefs. But
making sense of these disparate behavioral phenomena is easier when we acknowledge directly that
what we observe is the manifestation of a sophisticated biological system in which environmental
cues trigger predictable internal neurological and physiological responses; that this system shows
all the signs of being adapted to a pre-industrial environment; and that drugs of abuse, largely
developed in the modern era, have the demonstrable ability to disrupt this system.
It has not escaped our notice that the mismatch we have postulated between human biology and
the modern marketplace might extend beyond the realm of drugs and foodstuffs. In this essay,
we began with a narrow question: Why is every human being on the planet endowed at birth with
an endogenous opioid system, making each and every one of us susceptible to the effects of heroin
and other drugs? We then argued that although the evidence suggests this particular component
of the human nervous system evolved for a particular purpose (choosing a balanced diet), this
system can be “hijacked” by technological advances such as the syringe, refined sugar, and television
advertising. These observations have a very specific implication for economic decision theory (to
wit, the persistence of false beliefs), which–though it represents a departure from convention–leads
to a uniquely parsimonious explanation of many aspects of both dietary choice and substance abuse.
Given that there are other important ways in which pre-industrial environments differed from the
modern world, and that there are many other peculiarities of human behavior that provide fodder for
the laboratories of behavioral economists, it might be informative to investigate the natural origins
of the molecular systems involved. Needless to say, the links between ancestral environments, the
human genome, and modern health and well-being will always be indirect and will in every instance
require a synthesis of evidence from a broad array of disciplines. But this does not mean the links
are not real, and the alternative–ignoring or dismissing such evidence as irrelevant or peripheral–is
not likely to yield a sustainable science of economics.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. If the agent chooses bundle (x, a), then the nutritional content is
Cxx+ Caa, which has density function
h (t) =
∫ ∞
−∞
1
ax
fx
(y
x
)
fa
(
t− y
a
)
dy =
=
∫ min{x,t}
max{0,t−a}
β
ax
(
t− y
a
)β−1
dy =
=
[
− 1
x
(
t− y
a
)β]min{x,t}
max{0,t−a}
Carrying out the substitutions we obtain
h (t) =

1
x
(
t
a
)β
if x ≤ a, 0 ≤ t < x,
1
x
(
t
a
)β − 1x ( t−xa )β if x ≤ a, x ≤ t < a,
1
x − 1x
(
t−x
a
)β
if x ≤ a, a ≤ t ≤ x+ a,
1
x
(
t
a
)β
if a < x, 0 ≤ t < a,
1
x if a < x, a ≤ t < x,
1
x − 1x
(
t−x
a
)β
if a < x, x ≤ t ≤ x+ a,
0 if t < 0 or x+ a < t.
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Now in order to derive the agent’s objective function we must determine P (Cxx+ Caa ≥ k) =∫∞
k
h (t) dt. In particular,
P (Cxx+ Caa ≥ k) =

0 if a+ x ≤ k
1− k−ax − 1β+1 ax + 1β+1 ax
(
k−x
a
)β+1
if a ≤ k < a+ x
1− 1β+1 ax
(
k
a
)β+1
+ 1β+1
a
x
(
k−x
a
)β+1
if x ≤ k < a
1− 1β+1 ax
(
k
a
)β+1
if 0 ≤ k < x
1 if k < 0,
whenever x ≤ a, and
P (Cxx+ Caa ≥ k) =

0 if a+ x ≤ k
1− k−ax − 1β+1 ax + 1β+1 ax
(
k−x
a
)β+1
if x ≤ k < a+ x
1− k−ax − 1β+1 ax if a ≤ k < x
1− 1β+1 ax
(
k
a
)β+1
if 0 ≤ k < a
1 if k < 0,
whenever x > a. The indifference curves can be divided into five distinct regions, which we illustrate
in Figure 3. The death zone A0 =
{
(x, a) ∈ R2+ | a+ x ≤ k
}
in which the probability of survival
a
x
-
6
k
k a=k
x=k
@
@
@
@
A0
A−−
A++A−+
A+−
Figure 3: Five Regions
equals zero, the low-survival region A−− =
{
(x, a) ∈ R2+ | k < a+ x, a ≤ k, x ≤ k
}
in which survival
probability is positive but the consumption levels of both goods are insignificant (i.e., a, x ≤ k), the
region A−+ =
{
(x, a) ∈ R2+ | k < a, x ≤ k
}
in which the consumption level of a is significant while
that of x is not, the region A+− =
{
(x, a) ∈ R2+ | a ≤ k, k < x
}
in which the consumption level of
x is significant while that of a is not, and the region A++ =
{
(x, a) ∈ R2+ | k < a, k < x
}
in which
the consumption levels of both x and a are significant.41 With the exception of area A0, where the
region of indifference consists of the entire area of A0, the level curves going through regions A−−,
A−+, A+− and A++ are, as can be verified, strictly decreasing and continuously differentiable.
For our purposes, region A++ will play the major role, and therefore we describe the indifference
curves passing through this area in detail. In particular, within A++ we have hyperbolic indifference
curves given by
x =
1
(1− q) (β + 1)
kβ+1
aβ
, (4)
41We want to emphasize here that the regions depicted in Figure 3 do not only arise for the specific distribution
functions specified by Case 1, but arise in many other cases–for instance, whenever Assumption 1 is satisfied.
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where the probability of survival q must lie in
(
β
β+1 , 1
)
. As can be easily checked, the indifference
curves are convex within areas A+− and A++. We show in Figure 4 the indifference curves associated
with survival probabilities 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95 and 0.975, with parameter values β = 1 and
k = 1.
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Figure 4: Indifference Curves (β = 1, k = 1)
An important property of the points lying in area A++ is that the slope of the indifference curves
going through a fixed point (x, a) ∈ A++ increases (or, stated differently, decreases in absolute value)
as β increases. This can be verified by first calculating the following derivative in implicit form
da
dx
= −
∂
∂xP (Cxx+ Caa ≥ k)
∂
∂aP (Cxx+ Caa ≥ k)
= −
1
1+βk
1+β 1
x2aβ
1
1+βk
1+β β
xa1+β
= − a
βx
and then calculating
∂
∂β
(
− a
βx
)
=
a
xβ2
> 0. (5)
We can conclude by (5) that a positive cue increases the consumed amount of good a, since as we
already know the indifference curves are decreasing, continuous and moreover convex within A++.
Thus, a positive cue causes the agent to move in the direction of increasing a along the budget line.
The agent might even move into region A−+ (indeed, the possibility of a corner solution arises here,
as indifference curves in this region can be concave for parameter values β ∈ (0, 1)), but this causes
no problem because in this case we would have an even greater increase in the consumption of good
a.
From (4) one can see that in A++ the indifference curves are Cobb-Douglas indifference curves.42
Hence, we can formulate the following corollary:
Corollary 2 Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, the objective function P (Cxx+ Caa ≥ k) is
observationally equivalent to a Cobb-Douglas utility function within area A++.
42The indifference curves of a Cobb-Douglas utility function U (x, a) take the form xγaδ = q, where γ > 0 and
δ > 0 are parameters and q is a constant corresponding to the level. Any function with level curves that can be
represented in this way is observationally equivalent to a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
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Before we can proceed with the proof of Proposition 2 we need to define the notions of ε-benefit
and ε-loss formally. If the agent switches from bundle (x, a) to bundle
(
x− ε, a+ εp
)
, where ε > 0,
he increases the survival area in (cx, ca)-space by
B :=
{
(cx, ca) ∈ R2+ | 0 ≤ cx ≤
k
pa+ x
,
pk
pa+ ε
− cx p (x− ε)
pa+ ε
≤ ca ≤ k
a
− cxx
a
}
,
while he decreases the survival area by
L :=
{
(cx, ca) ∈ R2+ | 0 ≤ ca ≤
k
pa+ x
,
k
x
− ca a
x
≤ cx ≤ k
x− ε − ca
pa+ ε
p (x− ε)
}
(see Figure 2). We refer to the increased probability of survival attributable to the additional area
B as ε-benefit and to the decreased probability of survival attributable to the lost area L as ε-loss.
Remark 1 For any given ε ∈ (0, x) we can calculate the ε-benefit by∫ k
pa+x
0
∫ k
a−cx xa
pk
pa+ε−cx p(x−ε)pa+ε
fx (cx) f̂a (ca) dcadcx
and the ε-loss by ∫ kp
pa+ε
0
∫ k
x−ε−ca pa+εp(x−ε)
k
x−ca ax
fx (cx) f̂a (ca) dcxdca.
Proof of Proposition 2. The monotonicity of the objective functions P (Cxx+ Caa ≥ k) and
P
(
Cxx+ Ĉaa ≥ k
)
in (x, a), outside the area A0, imply that the indifference curves associated with
a positive probability of survival are strictly decreasing curves and that the agent will select in both
cases a bundle lying on his budget line x+ pa = m.
Since P (Cxx+ Caa ≥ k) =
∫ x+a
k
∫min{x,t}
max{0,t−a}
1
axfx
(
y
x
)
fa
(
t−y
a
)
dydt is a continuous function in
(x, a), the upper contour sets of the objective function are closed. This, and knowing that the
indifference curves associated with the objective function P (Cxx+ Caa ≥ k) are strictly decreas-
ing curves in case of positive survival probabilities, implies that these indifference curves must be
continuous. For the same reasons P
(
Cxx+ Ĉaa ≥ k
)
must also have continuous indifference curves.
If there exists an ε ∈ (0, x∗) such that the ε-benefit exceeds the ε-loss, then
P
(
Cxx
∗ + Ĉaa∗ ≥ k
)
= P (L ∪ C) < P (B ∪ C) =
= P
(
Cx (x
∗ − ε) + Ĉa
(
a∗ +
ε
p
)
≥ k
)
, (6)
where
C =
{
(cx, ca) ∈ R2+ | cxx∗ + caa∗ ≥ k and cx (x∗ − ε) + ca
(
a∗ +
ε
p
)
≥ k
}
,
and therefore, the agent increases his probability of survival by exchanging
(
x∗ − ε, a∗ + εp
)
for
(x∗, a∗). The single-crossing property imposed on the two indifference curves associated with the
no-cue balanced diet problem and the positive-cue balanced diet problem that pass through (x∗, a∗),
together with equation (6) implies that the former indifference curve must lie below the latter
whenever x > x∗. Hence, consuming less than a∗ in the positive-cue balanced diet problem will
be dominated by the allocation a∗ + εp ., and the solution to the positive-cue balanced diet problem
necessarily occurs where â > a∗.
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It remains to be shown that if there does not exist an ε ∈ (0, x∗) such that the ε-benefit exceeds
the ε-loss, then the solution to the positive-cue balanced diet problem will occur where â ≤ a∗.
Noting that this implies that expression (6) cannot be satisfied, â ≤ a∗ is implied by the uniqueness
of the solution â.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, we verify that a positive cue increases the expected probability
of the occurrence of the cue, i.e., EΠt < EΠt+1. To see this multiply both sides of equation (3) by
pi and thereafter integrate both sides with respect to pi to get
EΠt+1 =
∫ 1
0
pigt+1 (pi) =
∫ 1
0
pi2gt (pi) dpi∫ 1
0
pigt (pi) dpi
=
EΠ2t
EΠt
. (7)
Now, employing a Jensen-type inequality for strictly convex functions and for non-degenerate as well
as non-negative random variables we obtain EΠt < EΠt+1 by (7).
For any point (m− pa, a) lying on the budget line we obtain from the definitions of vt and vt+1
(suppressing the arguments (m− pa, a)) that
d
da
vt+1 − d
da
vt = (EΠt+1 − EΠt)
(
∂u
∂a
− p∂u
∂x
−
(
∂u
∂a
− p∂u
∂x
))
. (8)
Noting that the first factor of the right-hand side of (8) is positive, we now need to show that the
second factor is positive. This is equivalent to demonstrating the inequality(
∂u
∂a
∂u
∂x
− p
)
∂u
∂x
>
(
∂u
∂a
∂u
∂x
− p
)
∂u
∂x
(9)
at (m− pa, a). We have ∂u∂x (m− pa, a) > 0 and ∂u∂x (m− pa, a) > 0 by the monotonicity of the
utility functions outside the death zone A0.
Since we assumed that the optimal solutions associated with the no-cue balanced diet problem
and the positive-cue balanced diet problem have unique solutions in A++, we get
(
xc, ac
)
and (xc, ac)
by solving the respective first-order conditions. Hence,
∂u
∂a (x
c, ac)
∂u
∂x (x
c, ac)
= p and
∂u
∂a
(
xc, ac
)
∂u
∂x (x
c, ac)
= p, (10)
where xc = m− pac and xc = m− pac by the monotonicity of the objective functions. Therefore,
as illustrated in Figure 5, it follows from strict concavity of the objective functions that ∂u∂a/
∂u
∂x > p
if k < a < ac, ∂u∂a/
∂u
∂x < p if a > a
c, ∂u∂a/
∂u
∂x > p if k < a < a
c and ∂u∂a/
∂u
∂x < p if a > a
c at a point
(m− pa, a). Thus, (9) is satisfied for all a ∈ [ac, ac].
Finally, we need to verify our statement on the solution (x∗, a∗) of problem (2). Observe that the
optimal solution (x∗, a∗) at time t must lie on the budget line by the monotonicity of the objective
function of (2). Hence, x∗ = m−pa∗. Since u and u are strictly concave in A++, it follows that vt is
also strictly concave in A++. Therefore, and by the assumption that the optimal solution associated
with problem (2) lies also in A++, the first-order condition
EΠt
(
∂u
∂a
∂u
∂x
− p
)
∂u
∂x
+ (1− EΠt)
(
∂u
∂a
∂u
∂x
− p
)
∂u
∂x
= 0
of problem (2) determines (x∗, a∗) = (m− pa∗, a∗) and we see that
∂u
∂a
∂u
∂x
− p and
∂u
∂a
∂u
∂x
− p (11)
cannot have the same sign.43 However, this implies–as illustrated in Figure 5–that a∗ ∈ (ac, ac),
because otherwise the two expressions in (11) would have identical signs.
43Observe that the two terms in (11) cannot equal zero at the same point on the budget line because of ac < ac
and (10).
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Figure 5: Intermediate Optimum
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that the agent maximizes his subjective function v˜t instead
of vt in problem (2). Observe that for the subjective function v˜t we can apply Proposition 3. Hence,
subjective adjacent complementarity is satisfied at (x˜t, a˜t) and we must have 0 =
d
da v˜t (m− pa˜t, a˜t) <
d
da v˜t+1 (m− pa˜t, a˜t). Now since a˜t+1 is the unique solution of dda v˜t+1 (m− pa, a) = 0 within the
region x, a > k, it follows that a˜t < a˜t+1. It remains to be shown that the agent’s true expected
survival probability given by vt (m− pa˜t, a˜t) decreases strictly in time. Clearly, the agent is moving
along the budget line farther and farther away from his true expected survival maximizing bundle
(xc, ac) because a˜t increases. This implies by the strict concavity of vt = u that vt (x˜t, a˜t) >
vt+1 (x˜t+1, a˜t+1).
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